

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: HIROSE, Hisatada

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, HIROSE, Hisatada, make oath and say as follows:

1. I, HIROSE, Hisatada, served in the Home Ministry the longest of all the government offices which I held. In January, 1938, I was appointed Vice-Minister of Welfare to assist Marquis KIDO, who was appointed the first Minister of Welfare. In January, 1939 when the HIRANUMA Cabinet was formed, I was appointed Minister of Welfare, from which post I resigned in August, the same year when the HIRANUMA Cabinet resigned en bloc. In January, 1940, I assumed the post of Chief of the Legislation Bureau in the YONAI Cabinet, from which I resigned in July, the same year. I then became a member of the House of Peers and in July, 1944, I was again appointed Minister of Welfare, this time under the KOISO Cabinet. In February, 1945, I was appointed

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- Minister of State and concurrently Chief Secretary to the same Cabinet, from which posts, however, I resigned the same month. In August, 1945, I was appointed Mayor of Tokyo Metropolis, from which post I resigned in January, 1946. I am not connected with any Government office now.
2. I have been on very intimate terms with Marquis KIDO since 1937 when he was Ministry of Welfare and I assisted him as Vice-Minister. In addition to my official relations with the Marquis, I called on him at his home on countless occasions. Since 1937 I have considered myself as one of the closest to Marquis KIDO of all Government officials, and I believe the converse is also true. This accounts for the fact that he expressed his views and comments to me quite freely on political questions and tyrannical ways of the gumbatsu or militarists on occasions too many to be enumerated.
3. I know from Marquis KIDO's official statements while we were both in the HIRANUMA Cabinet and from my conversations with him on other occasions that he consistently acted as an unswerving devotee of peace during his tenure of office as a Minister of State and as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.
4. At the time Marquis KIDO was Minister of Welfare and I was Vice-Minister, the Army was planning to operate the newly-created Ministry of Welfare according to its own ideas, but Marquis KIDO rejected the

interference and ran the Ministry with public welfare as its goal. The result was that a section of the Army attacked the Welfare Ministry. For instance, I recall that Surgeon Lieutenant-General KOIZUMI, then Chief of the Medical Service Bureau in the War Ministry, wrote an article which was published in the CHUGAI SHOGYO SHINPO, 27 September 1938 scathingly denouncing the Welfare Ministry under the caption: "Whether goes the KOSEI MARU (Welfare Ministry)? The soulless KOSEI MARU" (The Welfare Ministry was compared by the writer to a steamer without a rudder). As Vice-Minister of Welfare, then, I knew fully that Marquis KIDO paid no attention to such attacks on the Welfare Ministry.

5. When Marquis KIDO assumed the portfolio of Home Affairs under the HIRANUMA Cabinet, he told me he was very much worried about the question as to whether the draft bill pertaining to the municipal corporation system which his predecessor Admiral SUYETSUGU decided and which he took over from the Admiral should be introduced in the ordinary session of the Diet of 1939. Welfare Minister of the same Cabinet as I was, I was frequently consulted by the Marquis about the question. At length the Marquis decided not to introduce the bill in question to the Diet. One of the major reasons for Marquis KIDO's decision not to introduce the said bill in the Diet was that the bill was intended to reduce and restrict the powers of the municipal assemblies and increase the power of mayors and others.

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thereby running counter to the guiding principle of provincial autonomy, and molding the municipalities along Fascist lines. This demonstrates Marquis KIDO's opposition not only to a militaristic reform of the provincial system, for which there was a loud clamor at that time, but further to militarism, itself. While he was Home Minister Marquis KIDO never advocates an alliance with Germany and Italy either in Cabinet Meetings out of them. I heard him say he was worried about the effect of the divergence of opinion between the Army or Navy on the Japanese people and on the settlement of the China Affair.

6. Towards the end of the third KONOYE Cabinet, I called on Marquis KIDO at his home in October, 1941. I vividly remember that on that occasion he told me in his reception room to the following effect, when the conversation drifted on to a war with America and Britain:

"Japan has tried to defeat Chiang Kai-Shek for the past four years, but in vain. This is because Japan is limited in her resources, while China is a big country with a large population and ample resources. Now, what would happen, should she go to war with America and Britain? The operational area would be further extended; while the enemy would have far bigger manpower and richer resources. Such a war would be out of question for Japan, who has failed to defeat Chiang Kai-Shek with all her efforts in the past four years."

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It is still fresh in my memory that he opposed the jingoistic view or advocacy of war with America and Britain.

7. In November, 1941, I called on Marquis KIDO again at his home and in the same reception room and had a talk with him about his formation of the TOJO Cabinet. I asked him if there was danger of war breaking out between Japan and America because of General TOJO forming the new Cabinet, pointing out that the General was the representative of the tough elements in the Army. Whereupon, I remember clearly that the Marquis stated to the following effect:

"I recommended General TOJO to the Throne as new Prime Minister, prompted by the desire to lead the present difficult situation to peace. You only knew General TOJO during his tenure of office as Vice-Minister of War; but the TOJO of today has grown much bigger, as compared with his Vice-Minister days. He is not the man to think of war only, but on the contrary he is fitted for both peace and war. If our peace efforts are successful as we hope, the Army's reaction, or revolutionary outbreak will be the greatest cause for anxiety. And it is only General TOJO in military circles that is qualified to control the Army so as to prevent it from taking such a rash action. I have recommended General TOJO for the sake of peace. And that General TOJO has concurrently assumed the portfolio of Home Affairs is intended for restraining the rightist groups and preventing them from disturbing peace and

order in conjunction with the Army. This might very well happen if our negotiations with America are successful. General TOJO's concurrent assumption of the portfolio of Home affairs has such meaning. I am sure General TOJO is not the man to think of only war.

8. Marquis KIDO directly told me often that he constantly cudgelled his brains to prevent the Army from advancing in the political field, while avoiding a head-on clash with an Army which was feared would stir up a revolutionary disturbance. It has been my experience in my association with him that Marquis KIDO was opposed to the bellicosity of the gumbatsu or militarists. On my part, I fully discerned his antipathy to the Army's attitude after the Manchurian incident through my conversations with him. Marquis KIDO was not on specially friendly terms with any of the gumbatsu or militarists. As Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, naturally it was part of his duties to confer with all officials in high places, but I know he never transferred his allegiance from KONOYE to TOJO. He was a friend to KONOYE, but his association with TOJO was purely formalistic. Furthermore the fact is that he was conscientious in his work in the various governmental positions held by him. This must not be mistaken to mean that he made his office more important than it should have been.
9. I am fully acquainted that Marquis KIDO put forth extraordinary

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efforts to bring the Pacific war to a close as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. For instance, he played a leading role in the formation of a Cabinet, headed by Admiral SUZUKI, Kantaro, and advocate of peace. Again, I, myself, acted as liaison man between Admiral YONAI, Navy Minister and leading peace advocate in the SUZUKI Cabinet, and Marquis KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I heard Admiral YONAI say that Marquis KIDO was chiefly responsible for the termination of hostilities and restoration of peace and also heard from various sources that Prince KONOYE also made similar statement.

On this 6 day of Feb., 1947

At I.M.T.F.E.

Deponent: HIROSE, Hisatada (seal)

I, HOZUMI, Shigetaka hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At same place

Witness: /s/ HOZUMI, Shigetaka (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ HIROSE, Hisatada (seal)

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓供述書

供述書

廣瀬

久慈

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ元ツ別紙ノ所ニ宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次ノ
如ク供述致シマス

私、廣瀬久忠ハ宣誓ノ上左ノ通り陳述ス。

一、私、廣瀬久忠ハ私ノ務メタ役所ノ中内務省ニ最モ永ク在職シ、一九三八
年（昭和十三年）一月木戸初代厚生大臣ノ下ニ厚生次官トナリ、一九三九
年（昭和十四年）一月平沼内閣ノ厚生大臣ニ親任セラレ、同年八月内閣總
辭職ニ依リ退官、一九四〇年（昭和十五年）一月米内々閣ノ法制局長官ト
ナリ同年七月退官シタ。ソレカラ私ハ貴族院議員ニナツタ。亦一九四四年
（昭和十九年）七月小磯内閣ノ厚生大臣ニ再ビ親任セラレ、一九四五年（
昭和二十年）二月同内閣ノ國務大臣兼内閣書記官長ニ任ゼラレ、同年同月
退官、更ニ一九四五年（昭和二十年）八月東京都長官ニ親任セラレ、翌一
九四六年（昭和二十一年）一月退官、現在ニ遷シタモノデアル。

二、私ハ一九三七年（昭和十二年）一月退官、現在ニ遷シタモノデアル。
ラ今日迄十年ニ亘ル期間、公ノ關係ノ外ニ始終家庭ニモ出入リシテ非常ニ
親シイ關係ニアツタ。

一九三七年（昭和十二年）以後役人ノ方面デハ悉ク自分ガ木戸候ニ最モ
親近ナモノデアルト考ヘ、又ソレハ本當デアルト信ズル。

隨ツテ木戸候ハ政治問題ヤ軍閥ノ事情ニ關シテ腹減ナキ意見ヤ批判ヲ此處
ニ一々其時ヲ擧ケ待ナイ程ニ屢々私ニ物語ツタ。

三、私ハ國務大臣トシテノ候、内大臣トシテノ候ハ一貫シテ平和ヲ胸ニシテ

行動シテ來タコトヲ吾々兩人ガ共ニ平沼内閣ニ居タ時ノ同候ノ公ノ談話及
 ビ他ノ機曾ニナシタ彼トノ會話カラ知ツテ居ル。
 四、本戶侯ガ厚生大臣テ私ガ厚生次官テアツタ當時陸軍ハ厚生省ヲ作り軍ノ
 意圖ヲ之ニ注入セントシタ。併シ候ハ之ヲ退ケ國民福ヲ同省ノ目標トシ
 テ進ンタ。之ガ爲陸軍ノ一部ニハ厚生省ニ批難ヲ加ヘル者モ生ジ、就中當
 時陸軍省國務局長タリシ小泉軍中將ハ一九三八年（昭和十三年）九月二
 十七日ノ中外商業新報紙上ニ「厚生丸ハ何處ニ行クカ？魂ナキ厚生丸云々」
 等ノ記事ヲ掲ゲテ攻撃シタコトヲ私ハ記憶シテ居ル。併シ候ハ全然之ヲ相
 手トシナカツタコトハ次官トシテ私ノヨク知ツテ居ル處テアル。
 五、平沼内閣ノ内務大臣トシテノ本戶侯ガ末次前内相ノ決定シタル町村制案
 ヲ受繼ギ一九三九年（昭和十四年）ノ通常議會ニ提出スルカ否カ非常ニ固
 マレタコトヲ候ハ私ニ話サレタ。之ニツイテハ私ハ同ジ内閣ノ厚生大臣タ
 リシ爲屢々相談ヲ受ケタカ遂ニ不提出ト決定シタ。
 其ノ不提出トシタ事ノ理由ノ一ツニシテ主要ナルモノハソノ町村制案ガ町
 村會ノ權限ヲ輕クシ少クシ、町村長ノ權限ヲ重大ニスルモノデ、フアシス
 トノ線ニ沿フ自治制ノ形成テアルト云フ點ニアツタ。之ヲ不提出ニスルト
 云フコトハ當時盛ンテアツタ軍國主義反對ノ現レノ一ツデアツタ。
 内務大臣在職中本戶侯ハ閣議ニ於テモ、或ハ閣議外デモ決シテ日獨伊三四

同盟ヲ支持シタコトハナカツタ。私ハ候ヨリ陸海軍ノ意見ノ相違シテ居ル
コトガ日本國民ト支那事變ノ解決ニ與ヘル影響ニ付心配シテ居ルト云フコ
トヲ聞イタ。

六、私ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）十月第三次近衛内閣ノ末期ニ候ノ私邸ノ
隱妻間ニ於テ左ノ如キ對話ヲナシタコトヲ明ニ記憶シテ居ル。即、談ガ偶
々對米英戦争ノ事ニ及ンタ時ニ候ハ

「日本ハ今日迄三ヶ年餘モ蒋介石ヲ討タントシテ討テオウセナイ。ソレハ
支那ガ國ガ犬キク民ガ多ク、物資ガ豊カニシテ、我國力ガ足ラナイカラ
ダ。ソレナノニ今藥ヲ相手ニシタラ如何ナルカ、戦フ可キ面積ハ愈々
廣ク、人ハ益々多ク物資ハ彌ガ上ニ多イデハナイカ、三年カ、ツテ蒋介石
石ヲ討テ得ナイ日本ニハ問題ニナラナイデハナイカ。」

七、一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月私ハ前述ト同ジ候ノ私邸ニ應接間デ東
條内閣成立ニツキ話シ、東條ハ軍内閣ノ強硬論者デアアル。之ガ總理トナツ
テハ戦争ガ始マル虞レ無キヤヲ質問シタコトガアル。其ノ際候ハ

「自分ガ東條總理ヲ榮請シタノハ實ハ今日ノ難局ヲ和平ニ導カントシテ居
ルノダ。君ハ次官時代ノ東條ヲ知ツテ居ルノミダガ、今日ノ東條ハ次官
時代ニ比ベテ大キクナツタ。彼ハ戦争一本ノ男テハナイ。和戦何レニモ
向キ得ル人物デアアル。若シ吾々ノ平和ハノ努力ガ希望通り成功シタ場合

八、ト語ラレタコトヲ明ニ記憶シテ居ル。
 如何ニシテ軍部の政治進出ヲ阻止スルカニ就イテ命ニ苦心シテ居ラレタコトハ同侯ヨリ屢々直接ニ談話ヲ開イテ私ハ能ク知ツテ居ル。
 木戸侯トノ交際ニヨル私ノ經驗ニ依ツテモ侯ハ軍閥ノ好戰主義ニハ反對デ
 「ツタ私ハ木戸侯トノ會話テ滿洲事變以來ノ陸軍ノ態度ニ對スル同侯ノ反
 感ヲ充分感知シタ。
 同侯ハ軍閥ニハ一人モ特別ニ懸念ナル間柄ノ者ハナカツタ。
 内大臣トシテ凡ユル上層ノ高官ト連絡スルノハ勿論侯ノ職務ノ一部デアツ
 タ。併シ私ハ侯ガ近衛カラ東條ニ信頼ヲ移シタト云フコトハ全然知ラナイ
 侯ハ近衛トハ友人デアツタ併シ東條トノ交際ハ全ク形式的ナモノデアツタ。

ニ最モ心配ナノハ陸軍ノ反接デアアル。革命的動向デアアル。而シテ此ノ陸
 軍ノ妄動ヲ遂ヘテ統御シ得ル最適任者ハ陸軍部内テ東條ノミデアアル。目
 分ハ和平ノ爲ニ東條ヲ推シタノデアアル。
 殊ニ東條ガ内務大臣ヲ兼任シタノハ陸軍ト一著ニナツテ國內ヲ攪亂スル
 虞アル右翼系ノ活動ヲ抑ヘンガ爲デアアル。斯ル事ハ米國トノ交渉ガ成功
 シタ場合ニハ非常ニ起リ得ベキコトデアアル。東條ノ内相兼任ニハ斯如キ
 意味ガアル程故、大丈夫東條ハ戰爭一點張りノ男テハナイ。

ニ最モ心配ナノハ陸軍ノ反撥デアアル。革命的動向デアアル。而シテ此ノ陸軍ノ妄動ヲ感ヘテ統御シ得ル最適任者ハ陸軍部内テ東條ノミデアアル。目分ハ和平ノ爲ニ東條ヲ推シタノデアアル。

殊ニ東條ガ内務大臣ヲ兼任シタノハ陸軍ト一著ニナツテ國內ヲ擾亂スル虞アル右翼系ノ活動ヲ抑ヘンガ爲デアアル。斯ル事ハ米國トノ交渉ガ成功シタ場合ニハ非常ニ起リ得ベキコトデアアル。東條ノ内相兼任ニハ斯如キ意味ガアル程故、大丈夫東條ハ戦争一點張りノ男デハナイ。ト語ラレタコトヲ明ニ記憶シテ居ル。

八、木戸侯ガ革命的ナ動亂ヲ惹キ起ス虞アル軍部トノ正面衝突ヲ回避シツ、如何ニシテ軍部ノ政治進出ヲ阻止スルカニ就イテ常ニ苦心シテ居ラレタコトハ同侯ヨリ屢々直接ニ談話ヲ聞イテ私ハ能ク知ツテ居ル。

木戸侯トノ交際ニヨル私ノ經驗ニ依ツテモ侯ハ軍閥ノ好戦主義ニハ反對デ「ツタ私ハ木戸侯トノ會話ヲ滿洲事變以來ノ陸軍ノ態度ニ對スル同侯ノ反感ヲ充分感知シタ。

同侯ハ軍閥ニハ一人モ特別ニ懇意ナル間柄ノ者ハナカツタ。

内大臣トシテ凡ユル上層ノ高官ト連絡スルノハ勿論侯ノ職務ノ一部デアツタ。併シ私ハ侯ガ近衛カラ東條ニ信頼ヲ移シタト云フコトハ全然知ラナイ候ハ近衛トハ友人デアツタ併シ東條トノ交際ハ全ク形式的ナモノデアツタ。

更ニ候ハ候ガツイタ種々ナ公ノ地位ニ於テ自分ノ仕事ニ良心的デアツタト
 云フコトハ事實デアル。而シ右ノ事ハ候ガ彼ノ地位ヲソノ地位ガ持ツ以上
 ニ重要ナモノトシタト云フコトヲ意味スルモノトセバソレハ誤解デアル。
 九、大東亞戦争ノ終結ニ付不戸候ガ内大臣トシテ非常ナル努力ヲナシタ事實
 ハ私ノ能ク知ツテ居ル處デアルガ、特ニ和平論者タル鈴木貫太郎大將ヲ首
 班トセル内閣ノ成立ニ努力セラレタルコト、及鈴木不内閣ノ主タル和平論者
 タル米内海軍大臣ト不戸候トノ協力ニツキ私自身其ノ間ニ連絡ノ係リヲナ
 シタコト等ガ擧ゲラレル。
 私ハ米内元首相ガ終戦ニ就テハ何ト云ツサモ不戸候ガ第一ノ功勞者ダト云
 私レタコトヲ聞イテ居ルシ、又近衛公モ同様ナ話ヲサレテ居ルコトヲ種々
 ナ人カラ聞イテ居ル。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）二月六日 於

極東國際軍事裁判所

供 述 者 廣 瀬 久 忠

右ハ當立證人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同 日 於 同 所

立 證 人 穗 積 重 威

宣誓書

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ默秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ
誓フ

署名捺印

廣瀬久忠

辯護詞文書二二五九號

廣瀬久樹供託書正誤表

誤

正

三頁四行

三年

四年

三頁七行

三年

四年

三頁七行八行之間に左記の文挿入のこと

ト諾リ、米英トノ戦争ニ反對シタコトヲ記憶シテ居ル